Third Anniversary Workshop
February 17, 18, 24, 25, 29
Chair: Yiwen Zhan (Beijing Normal University)
Chair: Yiwen Zhan (Beijing Normal University)
Day 1 (Saturday, 17 February 2024 EST)
20:30 - 23:30 US (East Coast) 17:30 - 20:30 US (West Coast)
01:30 - 04:30 UK 09:30 - 12:30 China (Beijing)
20:30 - 23:30 US (East Coast) 17:30 - 20:30 US (West Coast)
01:30 - 04:30 UK 09:30 - 12:30 China (Beijing)
20:30 - 22:00 EST
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Qichen Yan
(Princeton University) |
General Relativity and the Absolute Present
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22:00 - 23:30 EST
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Minghui Yang
(University of Massachusetts Amherst) |
Metasemantic Perspective on Structural Realism
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Day 2 (Sunday, 18 February 2024 EST)
09:00 - 12:00 US (East Coast) 06:00 - 09:00 US (West Coast)
14:00 - 17:00 UK 22:00 - 01:00 China (Beijing)
09:00 - 12:00 US (East Coast) 06:00 - 09:00 US (West Coast)
14:00 - 17:00 UK 22:00 - 01:00 China (Beijing)
09:00 - 10:30 EST
|
Minzhe Li
(ILLC, University of of Amsterdam) |
Representational Equivalence and Duality
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10:30 - 12:00 EST
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Xiao Li
(University of Vienna) |
Does Higher-Order Metaphysics Address Metaphysical Problems?
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Day 3 (Saturday, 24 February 2024 EST)
20:30 - 23:30 US (East Coast) 17:30 - 20:30 US (West Coast)
01:30 - 04:30 UK 09:30 - 12:30 China (Beijing)
20:30 - 23:30 US (East Coast) 17:30 - 20:30 US (West Coast)
01:30 - 04:30 UK 09:30 - 12:30 China (Beijing)
20:30 - 22:00 EST
|
Christopher Sun
(New York University) |
Worlds from Inside and Worlds from Outside
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22:00 - 23:30 EST
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Arthur Wu
(University of Southern California) |
Two Logics of Opacity
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Day 4 (Sunday, 25 February 2024 EST)
20:30 - 23:30 US (East Coast) 17:30 - 20:30 US (West Coast)
01:30 - 04:30 UK 09:30 - 12:30 China (Beijing)
20:30 - 23:30 US (East Coast) 17:30 - 20:30 US (West Coast)
01:30 - 04:30 UK 09:30 - 12:30 China (Beijing)
20:30 - 22:00 EST
|
Helena Fang
(Tufts University) |
Belief-as-Best-Guess and Its Limits
|
22:00 - 23:30 EST
|
Jin Zeng
(University of Southern California) |
Higher-order Meinongianism
|
Day 5 (Tuesday, 5 March 2024 EST)
20:30 - 22:30 US (East Coast) 17:30 - 19:30 US (West Coast)
01:30 - 03:30 UK 09:30 - 11:30 China (Beijing)
20:30 - 22:30 US (East Coast) 17:30 - 19:30 US (West Coast)
01:30 - 03:30 UK 09:30 - 11:30 China (Beijing)
KEYNOTE
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Jeremy Goodman
(Johns Hopkins University) |
Frege Meets Calder: Exploring A Non-Linear Higher-Order Language
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ABSTRACTS
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Frege Meets Calder: Exploring A Non-Linear Higher-Order Language (Jeremy Goodman)
What would it be like to have a formal language in which relation symbols' argument places had no intrinsic order? For example, what if we thought of "<" and ">" as literally the same symbol but in different orientations? The challenge for any such notation is how to talk about properties of relations, like being well-founded or being functional, which can hold in one direction but not in the other. The solution involves giving symbols internal structure. Symbols of different logical types will have different shapes, and a pair of symbols can be fitted together in more than one configuration, like LEGO bricks, yielding formulas reminiscent of Calderian mobiles. Giving symbols this internal structure has an unexpected upshot. By liberalizing the allowable ways of attaching symbols to each other, a completely variable-free notation becomes possible. For example, the formulas corresponding to "everyone loves someone" and "someone is loved by everyone" are both comprised of the same three symbols (for love, universal generality, and existential generality), but the symbols are attached to each other in different configurations. This resulting language is inter-translatable with an expressively adequate fragment of higher-order logic, and in such a way that two sentences of ordinary higher-order logic have the same translation if and only if they are beta-eta equivalent. I'll close by explaining how this language challenges familiar ways of formulating the idea of compositionality in formal semantics. |
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General Relativity and the Absolute Present (Qichen Yan):
In this handout I present a novel strategy to reconcile general relativity with the A-theory of time, which is crucially based on the idea that the following two A-theoretic doctrines, which are commonly assumed to be both indispensable for a complete A-theory of time, can indeed come apart: i) spacetime is divided into three parts: the absolute past, the absolute present and the absolute future; and ii) the passage of time is linear (or non-branching). I will argue that in the context of general relativity, so long as the spacetimes that concern us are globally hyperbolic, we are in a good position to maintain i)---at the cost of giving up ii). The point is, however, that even if the linearity of the passage of time has to be rejected, the combination of i) and a non-linear understanding of the passage of time can still give us a plausible A-theory of time, which suffices to serve the most important metaphysical purposes that we expect it to serve. |
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Metasemantic Perspective on Structural Realism (Minghui Yang)
Structural realism is often divided into two varieties: epistemic vs. ontic structural realism. I explore the possibility of a third option on the basis of metasemantic considerations. The rough idea is that our metasemantics allows us to track only structural constraints on the interpretations of a theory, and thus theories that are structurally equivalent (in whatever sense the structural realists care about) are semantically equivalent. I will also discuss whether this will collapse to certain forms of epistemic or ontic structural realism. |
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Representational Equivalence and Duality (Minzhe Li)
This talk presents a logical formalization of the current isomorphism criterion for duality (isomorphism between model triples) as well as the intuitive idea of representational equivalence. It is shown that, under specific assumptions, the isomorphism criterion of duality coincides with representational equivalence, which vindicates the folklore story that dual theories have the same representational power. A narrower notion of duality is also introduced which distinguishes it from more general kind of symmetries. |
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Does Higher-Order Metaphysics Address Metaphysical Problems? (Xiao Li)
Recent years have seen a growth of papers in the field of higher-order metaphysics (HOM for short). Since higher-order languages are quite different from both natural languages and first-order formal languages, the project of HOM may be viewed as conceptual engineering. Here comes the question of subject continuity, i.e. whether HOM addresses the original metaphysical. In this paper, I will argue that it is not easy for higher-order metaphysicians to establish the continuity of subject matter. Alternatively, I will suggest understanding HOM as the project of eliminating some old metaphysical questions. |
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Worlds from Inside and Worlds from Outside (Christopher Sun)
Some propositions are possible. But for many purposes, most prominently to do with our best physical theories, we need modal reality to have more structures than that. In particular, we want there to be possible worlds, available to serve as a map of modal space. In this paper, I develop a general framework, in a higher-order language, of investigating the behavior of such possible worlds. One aspect concerns how they interact with modalities---how good the map is. In this regard there is a natural cube of increasingly demanding theses. Another aspect concerns what they themselves are like modally---how fragile the map is. In this regard there is a natural classification of worlds according to whether they can be modally traced. In the end I offer some reasons, again to do with our best physical theories, to think that possible worlds behave very strangely. |
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Two Logics of Opacity (Arthur Wu)
Frege's puzzle might be treated as counterexamples to Leibniz's law. Taking this idea seriously, this talk offers two ways of weakening Leibniz's law and their corresponding logics. |
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Belief-as-Best-Guess and Its Limits (Helena Fang)
Various recent authors propose an account for rational belief, Belief as Best Guess, motivated by observed features of felicitous belief reports when agents confront a question without being certain about its answer. I raise a novel potential problem with the account when a further, unexplored type of constraint on permissible belief is taken into consideration. In particular, I show the thesis' incompatibility with a highly plausible cross-question principle, Inquisitive Closure, and argue that the Belief as Best Guess theorists could not get away with this unpleasant result. For those who are motivated to accept Inquisitive Closure, this provides them with a reason to doubt Belief as Best Guess. Moreover, the current investigation sheds light on further research into the potential limits of proposing similar question-sensitive accounts for propositional attitudes. |
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Higher-order Meinongianism (Jin Zeng)
Meinongianism, at its core, combines two fundamental doctrines: first, that individuals are abundant, with each collection of properties corresponding to an individual that instantiates exactly those properties; second, that existence is not being. Despite its depth, Meinongianism has historically faced underappreciation, primarily due to the apparent inconsistency of a naïve interpretation of its two doctrines. In this talk, I defend and develop Meinongianism within the framework of higher-order logic. I show that the naïve interpretation can be consistent once we are prepared to relinquish two related principles. The first principle, parallel to the first Meinongian doctrine, posits that properties are abundant, with each collection of individuals corresponding to a property that is instantiated by exactly those individuals. The second principle, tied to the second Meinongian doctrine, asserts that existence is itself a property. Then I refine the naïve interpretation. The resulting theory offers a novel version of necessitism that robustly addresses our intuitions about the contingency of existence. |
PAST EVENTS
Summer 2023 Workshop
July 14 - 15
see dedicated website for detailed program
see dedicated website for detailed program
Winter 2023 Workshop
February 18, 24, 25
Commemorating the Second Anniversary of STRUCTURA
Chair: Christopher Sun (University of Toronto)
Commemorating the Second Anniversary of STRUCTURA
Chair: Christopher Sun (University of Toronto)
Day 1 (Saturday, 18 February 2023 EST)
17:30 - 20:30 US (East Coast) 14:30 - 17:30 US (West Coast)
22:30 - 01:30 UK 06:30 - 09:30 China (Beijing)
17:30 - 20:30 US (East Coast) 14:30 - 17:30 US (West Coast)
22:30 - 01:30 UK 06:30 - 09:30 China (Beijing)
17:30 - 19:00 EST
|
Arthur Wu
(University of Oxford) |
Carnap's Anti-Realist Argument in
"Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" |
19:00 - 20:30 EST
|
Yudi Huang
(University of Calgary) |
Hyperintensionality: Semantic or Heuristic?
|
Day 2 (Friday, 24 February 2023 EST)
20:30 - 23:30 US (East Coast) 17:30 - 20:30 US (West Coast)
01:30 - 04:30 UK 09:30 - 12:30 China (Beijing)
20:30 - 23:30 US (East Coast) 17:30 - 20:30 US (West Coast)
01:30 - 04:30 UK 09:30 - 12:30 China (Beijing)
20:30 - 22:00 EST
|
Qichen Yan
(Princeton University) |
Grounds of Necessities
|
22:00 - 23:30 EST
|
Lingzhi Shi
(Princeton University) |
Grounding and the
Iterative Conception of Propositions |
Day 3 (Saturday, 25 February 2023 EST)
20:30 - 23:30 US (East Coast) 17:30 - 20:30 US (West Coast)
01:30 - 04:30 UK 09:30 - 12:30 China (Beijing)
20:30 - 23:30 US (East Coast) 17:30 - 20:30 US (West Coast)
01:30 - 04:30 UK 09:30 - 12:30 China (Beijing)
20:30 - 22:00 EST
|
Jin Zeng
(University of Southern California) |
Decision Theory Normalized
|
22:00 - 23:30 EST
|
Yiwen Zhan
(Beijing Normal University) |
Comparability and Its Limits
|
ABSTRACTS
Carnap's Anti-Realist Argument in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (Arthur Wu)
|
Rudolf Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (henceforth ESO) has been deemed as the major source of many contemporary anti-metaphysical attitudes. However, there's controversy over whether ESO actually presents an anti-metaphysical argument. This essay offers a novel interpretation of ESO and argues that ESO contains an anti-realist argument that resembles Putnam's famous model-theoretic argument. The essay also challenges the expressivist interpretation of ESO, proposed by Vera Flocke and Robert Kraut, based on the novel interpretation.
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Hyperintensionality: Semantic or Heuristic? (Yudi Huang)
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In recent works and lectures on hyperintensionality, Timothy Williamson argues that hyperintensional phenomea in the literature are better understood as side effect of fallible heuristics. In this presentation, I will focus on one phenomenon extensively discussed by Timothy Williamson, i.e., nonvacuous counterpossibles. I compare his analysis based on heuristics and a semantic account I proposed in recent works.
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Grounds of Necessities (Qichen Yan)
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Necessity claims can be necessary in different senses. There are necessity facts of metaphysics, physics, biology, morality, and so on. It is interesting to ask if there is any systematic strategy to find out the grounds of each necessity fact in each sense of necessity. This paper aims to present a tentative answer to this question. I will argue that a fact prefixed by a necessity operator can be grounded in two systematic ways: 1) it can be grounded in some other-necessity facts through a kind of process which I call logical ground, which conforms to a series of schematic principles that are highly analogous to the principles that groundhogs usually endorse in the non-modalized setting; 2) it can also be grounded in the laws which govern the-necessity. Although the picture depicted by this paper is far from being complete, a plausible conjecture based on my arguments will be that all necessity facts, in whatever sense they are necessary, are ultimately grounded in different kinds of laws.
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Grounding and the Iterative Conception of Propositions (Lingzhi Shi)
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Classicism, the view that provable equivalence in higher-order classical logic suffices for identity, is often regarded as incompatible with a fine-grained picture of reality suggested by the orthodox theory of grounding. In this talk, we will assume Classicism, and explore a new theory of grounding which inherits core sights of the orthodox theory. The guiding idea is based on the belief that propositions are generated iteratively in a sequence of stages, where stage 0 is a collection of ungrounded propositions.
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Decision Theory Normalized (Jin Zeng)
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Rationality requires us to ignore sufficiently abnormal possibilities when deciding what we ought to do. I motivate a novel theory of decision based on this hypothesis and explore its consequences. One particular consequence of my theory is that normally we should take only one box in the Newcomb case.
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Comparability and Its Limits (Yiwen Zhan)
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In this talk I try to show that the framework of comparability (as recently advocated by Dorr, Nebel and Zuehl), though powerful, has important limits in its applications to cases with perspective-sensitive expressions.
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Summer 2022 Workshop
July 8, 15 - 18
(after reschedule)
21:00 - 24:00 China (Beijing)
14:00 - 17:00 UK
9:00 - 12:00 US (East Coast)
(after reschedule)
21:00 - 24:00 China (Beijing)
14:00 - 17:00 UK
9:00 - 12:00 US (East Coast)
Day 1 (Friday, 8 July 2022)
Chair: Lingzhi Shi (Princeton University)
Chair: Lingzhi Shi (Princeton University)
21:00 - 22:30
|
Guanglong Luo
(University of Konstanz) |
Nominalism and Objectivity
|
22:30 - 24:00
|
Jiqi Liu
(Peking University / University of St Andrews) |
Truthmaking Beyond Truthmakers:
A Solution for Negative Existentials |
Day 2 (Friday, 15 July 2022) (after reschedule)
Chair: Christopher Sun (University of Toronto)
Chair: Christopher Sun (University of Toronto)
21:00 - 22:30
|
Minzhe Li
(Peking University) |
Brute Identity Defanged
|
22:30 - 24:00
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Xiao Li
(University of Vienna) |
Coinciding Groups, The Grounding Problem,
and Hylomorphism |
Day 3 (Saturday, 16 July 2022)
Chair: Arthur Wu (University of Oxford)
Chair: Arthur Wu (University of Oxford)
21:00 - 22:30
|
Jin Zeng
(University of Southern California) |
Classical Normativity
|
22:30 - 24:00
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Qichen Yan
(Princeton University) |
Laws, Grounding, and Temporal Ontology
|
Day 4 (Sunday, 17 July 2022)
Chair: Christopher Sun (University of Toronto)
Chair: Christopher Sun (University of Toronto)
21:00 - 22:30
|
Asher Jiang
(Tsinghua University) |
On Thomasson's Metaontological Deflationism
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22:30 - 24:00
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Yiwen Zhan
(Beijing Normal University) |
Pluralities, Groups, and Opacity
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Day 5 (Monday, 18 July 2022)
Chair: Yiwen Zhan (Beijing Normal University)
Chair: Yiwen Zhan (Beijing Normal University)
21:00 - 22:30
|
Helena Fang
(Tufts University) |
Confirmation is Fragile:
On the Puzzle of Zetetic Norms |
22:30 - 24:00
|
Yudi Huang
(University of Calgary) |
Truthmaker and Conditionality
|
ABSTRACTS
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Nominalism and Objectivity (Guanglong Luo)
We observe that Putnam’s model-theoretic argument against determinacy of the concept of second-order quantification or that of the set is an innocent argument to the nominalist, it serves as a good motivation for the nominalist philosophy of mathematics, but in the end it can lead to a serious challenge to the nominalist account of mathematical objectivity, if some minimal assumptions about the relation between mathematical objectivity and logical objectivity are made. We consider three strategies the nominalist might take to meet this challenge, we argue that all these strategies are untenable. To get what she wants, the nominalist still has hard work to be done. |
Truthmaking Beyond Truthmakers: A Solution for Negative Existentials (Jiqi Liu)
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The problem of negative truths is arguably the puzzle for truthmaking theory, called the holy grail (Molnar 2000, 85), and the dragon to be slain (Parsons 2006, 591). I propose to solve a piece of the puzzle, the truthmaking for negative existentials. The truthmaker is not the only factor that makes negative existentials true. My solution introduces a perimeter formed by the domain to constrain the truthmaking. It satisfies the main desideratum of Molnar’s tetrad (2000) and rejects Necessitarianism, which claims the truthmaker necessitates the truth. If my solution succeeds, it will show that truthmaking goes beyond the truthmaker.
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Coinciding Groups, The Grounding Problem, and Hylomorphism (Xiao Li)
Social ontology has long been a field where people use concepts and strategies from traditional metaphysics. In this paper, I will show how discussions in social ontology can inspire traditional metaphysics. Two objects can coincide with each other but have different sortal properties, modal properties, and persistence conditions. What grounds those differences? Hylomorphists suggest that it is because of the different forms. But without an adequate understanding of form, they cannot succeed. I argue that by considering the case of coinciding social groups, we can understand form as a network of roles, which can help solve the problem above. |
Brute Identity Defanged (Minzhe Li)
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Non-wellfounded set theories are set theories which believe that there are non-wellfounded sets. In this talk, I defend the most liberal of all non-well-founded set theories, Boffa set theory, against the most common accusation that has been raised in the literature, namely that it commits to distinct self-membered singletons, and hence, a kind of brute distinctness that metaphysicians have long detested since Leibniz. By careful logical analysis, I intend to show that the identity/distinctness in Boffa set theory is no more brute, in any reasonable sense, than that in any of its competitors, even ZFC. In other words, Boffa set theory can do just as well as all its competitors with respect to accounting for/reducing/eliminating/defining identity. A more general lesson, I believe, could be learned from this main thread of argument: it demonstrates a promising schema to reduce apparent anomaly of brute distinctness in various mathematical or physical structures, such as that of i and -i in complex analysis, which might be disconcerting especially for the nowadays popular structuralist realism in the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of science.
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Classical Normativity (Jin Zeng)
Classicism identifies provable equivalence in classical higher-order logic with identity. It implies intensionalism, according to which two propositions/properties/relations are necessarily co-extensive in the broadest sense only if they are identical. Over the past two decades, many philosophers have argued that intensionalism gives us no interesting metaethics. But it is not the case. In this talk, I first develop a concrete theory of normativity within a picture of Classicism, the core of which consists in a characterization of the property of being normative as well as the operation of normative necessity. This theory vindicates the widely accepted thesis that every normative truth holds in virtue of some non-normative truth. As a bonus, it also provides us a straight way of understanding Hume's law that one "can't get an ought from an is". Yet my theory is far from the whole story. I then briefly mention several theoretical degrees of freedom allowed by Classicism. We will end up with a very general framework of doing metaethics within a very coarse setting of grain: on the one hand, it shows inquires of normativity can be based, with formal rigor, on a maturely developed world view; on the other hand, we gain some abductive reasons for Classicism. |
Pluralities, Groups, and Opacity (Yiwen Zhan)
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In this talk I defend a ‘pluralist’ account of groups, according to which a group is neither a (singular) mereological sum nor a set of sums, but a list (or even better, a string) of sums. I show how this account, on the one hand, meets the desiderata for capturing the features of groups, and on the other hand, neatly accommodates ontological innocence. Such an account of groups can be seen as a generalization of the standard structure of mereology, which deals not only with compositions but also with constitutions. Based on such generalization, I further argue that, with certain singularization conditions in place, we can regard any composite objects as groups. Furthermore, as a more ambitious goal of my talk, I show how we can address the problem of linguistic opacity precisely in terms of the proposed account of groups.
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On Thomasson's Metaontological Deflationism (Asher Jiang)
Thomasson is one of the proponents of metaontological deflationism (a position according to which ontological questions are somehow shallow). According to Thomasson, ontological questions are shallow because they are very easy to answer (by empirical and/or conceptual means). Thomasson thinks that her approach is both exegetically adequate (as an interpretation of Carnap’s metaontological conception) and systematically attractive (as a rival of other neo-Carnapian deflationist positions). However, I argue that her approach is dissatisfying with regard to both aspects. |
Confirmation is Fragile: On the Puzzle of Zetetic Norms (Helena Fang)
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To solve the puzzle of zetetic norms, namely, the debate of whether and to what extent one may inquire into a question while already committed to a possible answer, two questions should be answered: a) What is the norm(s) of inquiry, if there were any? b) Why the puzzle would have been formed? I show that while Goodman and Holguín's distinction between two uses of the term 'belief' reasonably answers the What Question, remaining doubts press us to provide a more detailed account. I then suggest that a compelling answer to the Why Question is that, confirmation is particularly fragile when one's commitment to a possible answer is too strong. To show this, I present an intuitive framework such that once we take this answer onboard, we may immediately explain remaining puzzling cases as incessant checking and ‘just to be sure’ sentences.
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Truthmaker and Conditionality (Yudi Huang)
Possible world semantics has been a useful tool to analyaze various conceptions of conditionality. Truthmaker semantics, though having been proposed as a powerful alternative to possible world semantics, has said little about conditionals. A notion of the truthmaker for conditionals appears in Kit Fine's truthmaker semantics for intuitionistic logic, where a conditional is analyzed in terms of a conditional connection. My project is to generalize this idea of conditional connection and provide truthmaker accounts for a variety of conditionals. In this talk, I will first introduce the notion of conditional connection within the truthmaker framework. Then I will present my work on counterfactuals, results I have got, and chanllenges I have faced. Finally, I will discuss how this can be applied to other conditionals. |
Winter 2022 Workshop
January 21 - January 23
21:30 - 23:30 China (Beijing)
13:30 - 15:30 UK
8:30 - 10:30 US (East Coast)
21:30 - 23:30 China (Beijing)
13:30 - 15:30 UK
8:30 - 10:30 US (East Coast)
Chair: Lingzhi Shi
(Peking University)
(Peking University)
Schedule
Day 1 (Friday, 21 January 2022)
21:30 - 22:30
|
Christopher Sun
(University of Toronto) |
On Fundamentality and Definability:
Doing Higher-order Metaphysics of Physics |
Abstract: According to a widespread vision, fundamentality just is logical simplicity. Fundamental elements are not defined out of anything else, while everything else is defined out of them. I argue against this vision by looking into physical theories like geometrized gravitation and classical electromagnetism. To do this, I first give a higher-order axiomatization of differential geometry and develop a higher-order framework of doing metaphysics of spatiotemporal physics. Then I argue for two inter-connected theses under this framework: (i) Some fundamental elements are defined out of certain non-fundamental elements, which themselves are not defined out of fundamental ones. (ii) Two physical theories are equivalent only when they posit mutually definable fundamental elements. (i) and (ii) together naturally suggest a new account of fundamentality, which I call Cofundamentalism. And I conclude by addressing concerns about fineness of grain and metaphysical modality.
22:30 - 23:30
|
Minzhe Li
(Peking University) |
Quantifier Variance and Malignant Interpretations
|
Abstract: Quantifier Variance is the thesis that the meanings of quantifiers varies. One of its significant applications is to deflate some of the ontological debates that seem to many non-substantive or a mere verbal dispute. Quantifier variantists claim that for some ontological debates, such as one between mereologists and anti-mereologists, different sides should be charitably understood as using different languages in which the meaning of quantifiers do not coincide and apparently incompatible statements can be properly translated in such a way that the focused controversy evaporates. Then it is concluded that some ontological debates like one about mereology is not really about what the reality is like, but about what language we should choose. One lurking problem of this approach, however, is that the ‘charitable’ interpretation of the language used by one’s enemies may be accused of being actually inadequate, or even malignant in terms of delivering the opposite position. The special difficulty of addressing this problem lies in that quantifier variantists need to, on one hand, raise some certain theoretical restrictions to distinguish ‘good’, ‘charitable’ or ‘relevant’ interpretations from those truly inadequate or malignant ones, and, on the other hand, make sure that these restrictions are not too demanding in case that interpretations offered in intended situations of application also fail them. The line between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ interpretations must be carefully drawn. In this presentation, I intend to examine, based on current accounts of quantifier variance, several answers to this challenge, and suggest they are mostly too coarse-grained to be satisfiable. A tentative solution may also be proposed.
Day 2 (Saturday, 22 January 2022)
21:30 - 22:30
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Arthur Wu
(University of Oxford) |
An Easier Metaphysics?
|
Abstract: Considerations based on Tarskian model-theoretic semantics is ubiquitous in metaphysical theorising. However, to what extant are we justified in using model-theoretic semantics to theorise metaphysics? In this talk, I will offer a case study to show that certain problems faced by ontic structuralists and nominalists can be easily solved through adopting a semantics of higher-order logic in which the notion `satisfaction' is taken as primitive. The purpose of this talk is not to offer an abductive argument for the legitimacy of this novel semantics, nor is it to suggest that these problems should be solved by adopting such a semantics for the metaphysical status of this semantics remains opaque. The sole purpose of this talk is to show that Tarskian model-theoretic semantics indeed introduces draconian restrictions on our metaphysical theorising. The use of model-theoretic semantics in metaphysics, then, is not as innocent as it might appear to be.
22:30 - 23:30
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Jiqi Liu
(Peking University / University of St Andrews) |
Two Faces of Truthmaking
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Abstract: Truthmaking theory's slogan is "a truth is true in virtue of its truthmaker." This theory studies a certain relation that links the truth of a theory with the ontological repertory of the theory. This relation is called truthmaking, and it has been traditionally treated as a binary relation between truths and entities. Truthamking theory (Merricks 2007, Introduction xvi) is like a litmus test for metaphysical theory’s ontological honesty. The test is passed if it provides proper truthmakers for its truths. Another aspect of truthmaking has drawn attention. The intuition behind truthmaking relation motivates hyper-intensional semantics, which provides a finer grain cut than intensional semantics like possible worlds semantics (Yablo 2014; Fine 2015). Truthmaking semantics cashes out the "in virtue of" idea but largely leaves the metaphysical debate behind. Providing satisfactory truthmaking semantics does not necessarily involve the ontological status of the truthmaker. The metaphysical project and semantical project are like two faces of truthmaking. They serve different theoretical goals and have been treated as independent (Yablo 2014; Asay 2020). I agree that truthmaking indeed has two faces and will argue that if we understand truthmaking as a ternary relation, we can better understand how truth is linked with truthmaker. Truth is made true by the truthmaker through a truthmaking model that represents reality. Truthmaking relation’s components are the truth-bear from our language, the truthmaker in reality, and the model mediating between the two.
Day 3 (Sunday, 23 January 2022)
21:30 - 22:30
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Jin Zeng
(University of Southern California) |
A Fregean Semantics for Attitude Ascriptions
|
Abstract: Fregeanism is the view that an occurrence of an expression embedded in some propositional attitude ascription(s) refers to a sense, instead of its original referent. I put forward a novel Fregean semantics for propositional attitude ascriptions. Then I argue that given some criteria of theory choice, it is probably the best existing semantics for attitude ascriptions: (i) it is compatible with the validity of Leibniz's Law; (ii) it is not based on a mysterious theory of senses; (iii) it is neutral about how fine-grained reality is; (iv) it respects our propositional attitudes psychology; (v) it fits the linguistic data pretty well and provides us semantic explanations.
22:30 - 23:30
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Qichen Yan
(Princeton University) |
Why Must Things Change?
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Abstract: Presentists contend that change is real and that this phenomenon could be explained through appealing to the core doctrines of Presentism. However, Presentists have never exhibited an argument for thinking that change is an essential character of our universe. In this paper, I will argue that given Presentism, the universe must change its state at every time. As long as time moves forward, there must be something that comes to exist, ceases to exist, gains some new property, or loses some original property. In other words, the change of matter and the passage of time should be essentially correlated with each other.
Summer 2021 Workshop
July 31 - August 01
21:00 - 23:00 China
14:00 - 16:00 UK
9:00 - 11:00 US East Coast
21:00 - 23:00 China
14:00 - 16:00 UK
9:00 - 11:00 US East Coast
Chair: Yiwen Zhan
(Beijing Normal University)
(Beijing Normal University)
Schedule
Day 1 (Saturday, 31 July 2021)
21:00 - 21:40
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Yudi Huang
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An Exact Truthmaker Semantics for Conditionals
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21:40 - 22:20
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Lingzhi Shi
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How Fine-Grained are Grounding Facts?
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22:20 - 23:00
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Arthur Wu
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Substitutional Theory of Higher-Order Logical Consequence
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Day 2 (Sunday, 01 August 2021)
21:00 - 21:40
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Xiao Li
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Structures and Arbitrary Objects
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21:40 - 22:20
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Christopher Sun
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The Nature of and Contingency about Fundamentality
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22:20 - 23:00
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Qichen Yan
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Rational De Re Desires for Morality:
A Novel Theory of Moral Worth |
Abstract
Yudi Huang (University of Calgary): An Exact Truthmaker Semantics for Conditionals
In this presentation, I propose an exact truthmaker semantics for counterfactual as an alternative to the classical possible world semantics. I will firstly present the formal definition, followed by favorable logical results. Next, I will discuss some ideas for its applications in language and metaphysics. I will close with a job to be completed.
In this presentation, I propose an exact truthmaker semantics for counterfactual as an alternative to the classical possible world semantics. I will firstly present the formal definition, followed by favorable logical results. Next, I will discuss some ideas for its applications in language and metaphysics. I will close with a job to be completed.
Lingzhi Shi (Peking University): How Fine-Grained are Grounding Facts?
Suppose that a plurality of facts \(\Gamma_1\) fully grounds a fact \(\phi\), and a plurality of facts \(\Gamma_2\) fully grounds a fact \(\psi\). Does \(\Gamma_1 < \phi = \Gamma_2 < \psi\) entail that \(\Gamma_1=\Gamma_2\) (Let's use \(\Gamma_1<\phi\) to express "\(\Gamma_1\) full grounds \(\phi\)")? Let Grounding Structure be the thesis that for any two grounding facts \(\Gamma_1 < \phi\) and \(\Gamma_2 < \psi\), they express the same fact only if \(\Gamma_1\) and \(\Gamma_2\) express the same plurality of facts. Howevever, as Dorr (2016), Goodman (2017) and Fritz (forthcoming) have discussed much in recent years, reality cannot be so fine-grained as to enforce the existence of a distinct proposition (fact) for every plurality of propositions (facts). It is because Cantor's theorem shows that there are more pluralities of truths than truths. In this talk, I will first show how Grounding Structure itself entails a too fine-grained conception of reality, using a similar Cantorian reasoning as Fritz did. The main difference is that I do not assume any one of the seven principles of grounding he assumes in his paper. Next I will discuss how the rejection of Grounding Structure influences the recent debate about "iterated grounding" (what grounds the grounding fact). The conclusion is that the rejection of Grounding Structure poses a potential threat to those who hold the view that whenever \(\Gamma\) fully grounds \(\phi\), \(\Gamma\) fully grounds this grounding fact.
Suppose that a plurality of facts \(\Gamma_1\) fully grounds a fact \(\phi\), and a plurality of facts \(\Gamma_2\) fully grounds a fact \(\psi\). Does \(\Gamma_1 < \phi = \Gamma_2 < \psi\) entail that \(\Gamma_1=\Gamma_2\) (Let's use \(\Gamma_1<\phi\) to express "\(\Gamma_1\) full grounds \(\phi\)")? Let Grounding Structure be the thesis that for any two grounding facts \(\Gamma_1 < \phi\) and \(\Gamma_2 < \psi\), they express the same fact only if \(\Gamma_1\) and \(\Gamma_2\) express the same plurality of facts. Howevever, as Dorr (2016), Goodman (2017) and Fritz (forthcoming) have discussed much in recent years, reality cannot be so fine-grained as to enforce the existence of a distinct proposition (fact) for every plurality of propositions (facts). It is because Cantor's theorem shows that there are more pluralities of truths than truths. In this talk, I will first show how Grounding Structure itself entails a too fine-grained conception of reality, using a similar Cantorian reasoning as Fritz did. The main difference is that I do not assume any one of the seven principles of grounding he assumes in his paper. Next I will discuss how the rejection of Grounding Structure influences the recent debate about "iterated grounding" (what grounds the grounding fact). The conclusion is that the rejection of Grounding Structure poses a potential threat to those who hold the view that whenever \(\Gamma\) fully grounds \(\phi\), \(\Gamma\) fully grounds this grounding fact.
Arthur Wu (University of Oxford): Substitutional Theory of Higher-Order Logical Consequence
Recently, Halbach (2020a,b) presents a substitutional theory of logical consequence by taking certain semantic notion as primitive. I will extend Halbach’s theory to higher-order logical consequence (specifically, logical consequence based on applicative structures) and consider its possible applications in metaphysics.
Recently, Halbach (2020a,b) presents a substitutional theory of logical consequence by taking certain semantic notion as primitive. I will extend Halbach’s theory to higher-order logical consequence (specifically, logical consequence based on applicative structures) and consider its possible applications in metaphysics.
Xiao Li (Tsinghua University): Structures and Arbitrary Objects
It is commonly believed that some things are structural, and we can always talk about the structure of a structural thing. Thus, it seems a good idea to grant the prima facie existence of structures and take further metaphysical investigations into their natures. In this paper, I will argue that structures can be viewed as arbitrary objects, which can have other objects as their values. I will first investigate several general features of structures (universality, structural, self-instantiating, whole-priority), then show how structures can be viewed as arbitrary objects and how it can explain the general features of structures, and finally discuss some remaining problems of this view.
It is commonly believed that some things are structural, and we can always talk about the structure of a structural thing. Thus, it seems a good idea to grant the prima facie existence of structures and take further metaphysical investigations into their natures. In this paper, I will argue that structures can be viewed as arbitrary objects, which can have other objects as their values. I will first investigate several general features of structures (universality, structural, self-instantiating, whole-priority), then show how structures can be viewed as arbitrary objects and how it can explain the general features of structures, and finally discuss some remaining problems of this view.
Christopher Sun (University of Toronto): The Nature of and Contingency about Fundamentality
Combinatorialism is the idea that in fundamental reality, metaphysical possibility and logical consistency coincide. In this paper, I discuss whether facts about fundamentality (such as that “temporal metric is fundamental”) themselves are metaphysically necessary or contingent under Combinatorialism. To do this, I first carve reality into fundamentals, reducibles, and irreducibles (using both higher-order and first-order resources). Then I present four accounts of nature of fundamentality (according to which fundamentality is itself in turn fundamental, reducible or irreducible), and canvass what kinds of contingency about fundamentality each account licenses. I come to the conclusion that either every (non-)fundamental thing is necessarily (non-)fundamental, or everything both could be fundamental and could be non-fundamental. In the end, I also sketch an anti-Combinatorialist escape route for anyone disappointed by this result and other existing problems of Combinatorialism.
Combinatorialism is the idea that in fundamental reality, metaphysical possibility and logical consistency coincide. In this paper, I discuss whether facts about fundamentality (such as that “temporal metric is fundamental”) themselves are metaphysically necessary or contingent under Combinatorialism. To do this, I first carve reality into fundamentals, reducibles, and irreducibles (using both higher-order and first-order resources). Then I present four accounts of nature of fundamentality (according to which fundamentality is itself in turn fundamental, reducible or irreducible), and canvass what kinds of contingency about fundamentality each account licenses. I come to the conclusion that either every (non-)fundamental thing is necessarily (non-)fundamental, or everything both could be fundamental and could be non-fundamental. In the end, I also sketch an anti-Combinatorialist escape route for anyone disappointed by this result and other existing problems of Combinatorialism.
Qichen Yan (Princeton University): Rational De Re Desires for Morality: A Novel Theory of Moral Worth
To have moral worth an action not only needs to conform to the correct normative theory, but also needs to be motivated in the right way. All hands agree that one cannot perform a morally worthy action by accidentally doing the right thing. But they disagree about which motivating reasons are the right reasons to satisfy the “non-accidentality condition”. In this paper, I argue that an action which has moral worth must be motivated by a rational de re desire for morality. One de re cares about morality if one is acting from a desire for what is in fact morally significant, and one rationally de re cares about morality if it is rational for one to have this de re desire for morality in the relevant situation. On this view, a morally worthy action should not only be motivated by right reasons, but also exhibit a certain sort of rationality.
To have moral worth an action not only needs to conform to the correct normative theory, but also needs to be motivated in the right way. All hands agree that one cannot perform a morally worthy action by accidentally doing the right thing. But they disagree about which motivating reasons are the right reasons to satisfy the “non-accidentality condition”. In this paper, I argue that an action which has moral worth must be motivated by a rational de re desire for morality. One de re cares about morality if one is acting from a desire for what is in fact morally significant, and one rationally de re cares about morality if it is rational for one to have this de re desire for morality in the relevant situation. On this view, a morally worthy action should not only be motivated by right reasons, but also exhibit a certain sort of rationality.