

## Content/force distinction (Textor 2021)

### 1. The distinction

Taxonomic version: Speech acts with different forces can share the same propositional content.

Constitutive version: There is nothing assertive about propositional contents.

Frege's restricted taxonomic version: indicatives and interrogatives share the same thought.

### 2. Frege's two arguments

2.1 the argument from actor

2.2 the argument from propositional questions

(Co-Expression) An utterance of 'Yes' expresses (and asserts) the sense of its grammatical antecedent; an utterance of 'No' expresses and asserts the negation of the sense of its grammatical antecedent.

### 3. Inquisitive semantics

In the structured propositions framework, the interrogative sentence 'Is seawater salty?' expresses the set of thoughts that together exhaust the possible true answers to the question posed by the uttering of the interrogative sentence — {seawater is salty, seawater is not salty}.

Questions: highlighted a new property or in virtue of the content expressed by propositional questions?

An observation: -Isn't it raining? -Yes. (It is raining.)

-没有下雨吗? -是。(没下雨。)

Lesson: What propositional content is expressed/ is highlighted by an interrogative is not simply determined by its surficial syntactic structure.

### 4. The problem of propositional unity

The problem: What makes some things— for example, some Fregean senses—into one proposition for which the question of truth or falsity arises?

The content/force distinction blocks the type-of-mental/speech-act solution.

The abstract solution: The thought acknowledged as true by judgment  $j_1$  = the thought put forth by propositional question  $q_1$  if, and only if, One must, if one makes  $j_1$ , immediately answer 'Yes' to  $q_1$  (if the question arises).

Another solution: Fregean senses are abstracted from propositions which are ontological priori. (Armstrong's solution to the unity of states of affairs)

### 5. The problem of correct/incorrect judgment

1. A judges p

2. |—— p

Therefore:

3. A truly judges p.

But Frege's conception of indirect discourse scotches the idea of the same proposition occurring in these different contexts: because it understands 'A judges p' as a relational predication, the relata of which are the name of a thinker, 'A', and the name of a thought, 'p', it fixes it that the significance of 'p' inside this context is different from its significance outside. (Haddock 2019, 3.)

6. The problem of truthmaking

But now one can ask: in virtue of what is the forceless combination Pa associated with the truth-making relation that a falls under the extension of P, and thus with the claim Pa, rather than with the truth-making relation that a does not fall under P (or falls under the extension of  $\sim P$ ), and thus with the opposite claim  $\sim Pa$ ? This question cannot be answered, since Pa does not display an assertion, and therefore there is nothing that associates it with the positive rather than the negative judgment. (Kimhi 2018, 137.)

4.06 A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a picture of reality. (TLP)

7. Internal/external force?

Internal force: saying something (rather the opposite side)

External force: assertion, etc.